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I. INTRODUCTION
Most authors don't like to have their works copied and distributed
for free. They make a living, or try to, by selling access to their creations.' Since 1790, U.S. copyright law has assisted authors by giving
them a relatively exclusive right2 to make copies of their work in order,
Science. ' 3
according to the Constitution, "to Promote the Progress of
Legal rights, however, are not costless to enforce. Infringements must be
detected, infringers pursued, and if threats of legal action prove insufficient, costly litigation may be the only recourse. Nevertheless, until the
closing decades of the twentieth century the legal right to control copying served authors and publishers reasonably well, primarily because
copying itself was also costly. Before the advent of photocopiers, tape
*
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There are of course many exceptions. Academic authors, for example, typically
1.
prize dissemination over compensation for their articles and research (although not usually for
their textbooks). Even then, publishers and other middlemen often have a different agenda at
odds with free access.
2.
The first U.S. copyright statute, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, granted
the copyright owner "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending." Current law grants broader rights, including control over reproduction, derivative works,
distribution, performance, and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). However, there have always
been limitations. The list of "exclusive rights" in § 106 of the Copyright Act, for example, is
preceded by the phrase, "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122." 17 U.S.C.A § 106 (West 1996
& Supp. 2004).
3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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recorders, VCRs, and the eventual shift to digital formats, wholesale
copying was generally a laborious and expensive task likely to be undertaken only by someone intent on commercial exploitation. Those were
precisely the kinds of infringements that would justify a significant investment in copyright enforcement. Technology, particularly computers,
brought an abrupt change. Copying became easy, even for private users.
Legal remedies against private copiers are problematic because lawsuits
are rarely cost effective and non-commercial copying can raise credible
claims to fair use. As the practical limitations on copying eroded, copyright owners increasingly turned to self-help in the form of technological
protection schemes. The original floppy disks that held early computer
programs also soon contained anti-copying software.' Video cassettes
and digital audio tape also came with technologies intended to foil a copier, joined later by DVDs, e-books, and now music CDs and television
broadcasts.6 The result has been an escalating battle between copyright
owners who lock up their works with the latest technology and professional and amateur hackers who pick the locks for profit or fun. For a
time, copyright owners had reasonable hopes of at least moderate success in this technological rivalry. Technological protection measures
could foil most private copiers; commercial users who circumvented
protective measures to copy works could still be pursued through traditional copyright infringement actions. The exploding popularity of the
Internet and the World Wide Web altered the landscape. Decryption tools
developed by a single sophisticated user could now be distributed over
the Internet to anyone with the ability to click the "download" button on
a web site.7 Even worse for copyright owners, decrypted versions of their
4.
See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving anti-copying software released in 1983).
5.
By 1992, a new chapter had already been added to the Copyright Act in an effort to
assist the music industry in its attempt to control the copying of digital audio tapes. See Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 (2000).

6.

See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.

7.
The decryption program developed by a Norwegian teenager to defeat the protective software deployed by motion picture studios on their DVDs was quickly available on
hundreds of web sites. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 437-39 (2d

Cir. 2001). Some circumvention techniques are even easier to disseminate. Sony, for example,
came up with a technology intended to prevent users from playing or copying music CDs on
personal computers. The system relied on an initial track of bogus data that CD players ignored but PCs continuously tried to read, preventing access to the subsequent music tracks. A

few music fans discovered that if they marked over the edge of the CD with a felt-tipped pen,
the computer would skip the bogus track and go straight to the music. News of their discovery
quickly spread over the Internet. Matt Richtel, Digital Lock? Try a Hairpin, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2002, § 4, at 12. Another experiment with copy-protected CDs in 2003 produced a similar
result. BMG Music released a CD by R & B singer Anthony Hamilton that contained copy-

protection developed by SunnComm. A graduate student at Princeton quickly discovered that
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works could now themselves be disseminated to anyone with a computer
and Internet access. Copyright owners asked Congress for help, and
Congress responded with the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.'
Section 1201(a)(1) of the Copyright Act prohibits the act of "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work," including, for example, by-passing password protection or encryption intended to restrict access to paying customers. Section
1201(a)(2) prohibits the manufacture or sale of "any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof' primarily designed for
the purpose of circumventing access controls on copyrighted works. Additionally, § 1202(b) prohibits the manufacture or sale of products,
devices or services primarily designed to circumvent "a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner"-for example, a technological measure intended to prevent reproduction of a
copyrighted work. 9 Both the justification and breadth of the anticircumvention provisions were quickly challenged.'0 The ban against
circumvention devices, for example, can prevent many users from making a fair use of protected works. The problem illustrates a more general
threat. A legal prohibition against circumventing the protective measures
adopted by copyright owners leaves those owners with virtually absolute
control over the terms of use. Technological restrictions backed by the
force of law, coupled with contractual restraints imposed on users as a
the protection could be defeated by holding down the shify key when the CD was loaded into
the computer-a standard Windows technique used to prevent a program from running. After
he posted his findings on the Internet, SunnComm stock dropped 25 per cent in two days.
SunnComm threatened to sue under the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but backed down under pressure from BMG Music following a web and
e-mail campaign in support of the graduate student. Kevin Maney, Debate Heats Up as Student Spots Hole in CD Protection,USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 2003, at Al.
8.
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1205 (2000)).
The absence of a corresponding prohibition against the act of circumventing a tech9.
nological measure that protects a right of a copyright owner is explained in the legislative
history: "The copyright law has long forbidden copyright infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary. The device limitation in 1201(b) enforces the longstanding prohibitions on
infringements." S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
10.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention RegulationsNeed to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY. TECH. L.J. 519 (1999),
and Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Createda New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users' and Content Providers'
Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 277 (2001) (both commenting on the overbreadth of
the provisions). The empirical basis for the argument that the prohibitions are necessary to
prevent significant market failure has also been questioned. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The
Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA.L.REv. 813 (2001); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 279 (2001).
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condition of granting access, allow owners to avoid the limitations on
their control that have defined the traditional balance of copyright lawlimitations like first sale," fair use,"2 and the absence of protection for
facts and ideas. 3
Few dispute that the law should be alert to insure adequate incentive
to create in the face of new technologies for reproduction and dissemination. However, if the fundamental goal of copyright remains the
"Progress of Science", as the Supreme Court continues to assure us, '4
leaving copyright owners with complete control over every use of their
work is probably not for the best. The courts are not likely to take the
lead in preserving an efficient balance between protection and access;
poor public policy is not itself unconstitutional. 5 Congress too is
unlikely to withdraw or substantially reduce the support it has extended
to technological self-help measures through the DMCA. One means of
maintaining a reasonable equilibrium between owners and users does
remain. The system runs on the users' money. The market for works, if
functioning properly, can provide users with the leverage to insure adequate access. If owners wrap their works too tightly, users can decline to
buy. However, the power that users can exert through the market depends
on the quality of the information they have about the existence and effect
of the technological protective measures deployed by owners. Owners
should be required to disclose that information as the price for invoking
the DMCA's protection against circumvention and circumvention devices. After examining the legal and political background of the anticircumvention rules, this article analyzes the economics of disclosure
and proposes a version of mandatory disclosure that appears consistent
with both the objectives of the DMCA and the legitimate expectations of
users.

11.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). See also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) (allowing users to
make adaptations and archival copies of computer programs).
12.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000) (allowing limited
reproduction by libraries).
13.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). See, e.g., Bowers v.Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a claim for breach of a contract that barred users from reverse
engineering the plaintiff's copyrighted software). See also Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead?
Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 193, 194 (2000) ("To
paraphrase Sir Henry Maine, we will have a movement from copyright to contract.").
14.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212, 123 S. Ct. 769,784-85 (2003).
15.
"Beneath the facade of their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners
forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the [Copyright Term
Extension Act]'s long terms. The wisdom of Congress' action, however, is not within our
province to second guess." Id. at 222, 123 S. Ct. at 790 (upholding a twenty-year extension of
the term of copyright for works already in existence).

Fair'sFair
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II. THE LAW

AND POLITICS OF ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was enacted in 1998.6 It has
two main components. First, it offers a degree of immunity to Internet
service providers.' 7 Businesses offering Internet access, web hosting, and
information location services had been targeted by copyright owners
seeking to control on-line access to their works. The practical limitations
on suits against individual, often anonymous, Internet users made service
providers a tempting alternative. Section 512 establishes a series of safe
harbors for service providers, but only if they enlist in the fight against
unauthorized distribution.'"
The second principal component of the DMCA is the anticircumvention provisions codified in §§ 1201-05. ' 9 They broadly prohibit the circumvention of technological measures that control access to
works and the manufacture or trafficking in devices primarily designed
to circumvent either access controls or copy-protection. The anticircumvention provisions do incorporate minor attempts to preserve a
semblance of balance between protection and access. Section 1201 includes narrowly-drawn exemptions for circumvention by nonprofit
libraries, reverse engineering of computer programs in order to achieve
interoperability, and encryption research and network security testing. °
It also authorizes the Librarian of Congress to exempt particular classes
of works from the anti-circumvention (although not the anti-trafficking)
prohibition. 2' The anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions are
16.
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
17.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
18.
To be eligible for the limitations on liability offered under § 512, service providers
must implement policies for terminating the accounts of customers who are repeat infringers;
they must also accommodate standard technical measures used by copyright owners to identify and protect copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Providers who host potentially
infringing material, or who provide links to infringing content, must also, inter alia, comply
with notice and take-down requirements in order to earn the limitation on liability. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 512(c)-(d). See generallyAlfred C. Yen, Internet Service ProviderLiability for Subscriber
Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833
(2000) (concluding that § 512 creates too much incentive for service providers to cooperate
with copyright owners).
19.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000). In addition to the anti-circumvention provisions, the
DMCA in § 1202 includes protection for "copyright management information." 17 U.S.C.
§ 1202. Removal of information identifying the work or the copyright owner, or the terms and
conditions of use, is prohibited if there are reasonable grounds to know that the removal will
facilitate or conceal infringement. Id.
20.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(j).
21.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). There is no reason to believe that Congress intended this administrative delegation to yield major exclusions. "The Committee intends that
the 'particular class of [exempted] copyrighted works' be a narrow and focused subset of the
broad categories of works of authorship than is identified in Section 102 of the Copyright
Act." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 37-38 (1998). The Librarian of Congress has been
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applicable only to protective measures used on copyrighted works, but
the ease with which copyrighted and public domain works can be bundled effectively ties up the latter works as well. Section 1201(c)
proclaims that the anti-circumvention provisions shall not affect "defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use," but the effect is not
what it seems. A violation of the anti-circumvention provisions is not
"copyright infringement;" violations are actionable not as infringement
under § 501 of the Copyright Act, but under the DMCA's own cause of
action in § 1203, with its distinctive provisions on injunctions, actual
damages, and statutory damages. Thus, while fair use remains a defense
to claims of copyright infringement arising from the use of a work after
circumvention, it is no defense to the circumvention (or trafficking) itself.2" Taken as a whole, the anti-circumvention provisions deliver as
advertised, leaving owners with the legal right to control virtually all
access and use of their protected works.
It seems unlikely that legal challenges will significantly limit the
prerogatives of copyright owners under the anti-circumvention provisions. At least in their major contours, the language and intent of the
provisions seem plain, and judicial assessments of their wisdom will not
play a decisive role. Users and their champions are left with an assortment of constitutional attacks against the anti-circumvention rules, none
with much chance of success.
The first prominent judicial challenge to the anti-circumvention provisions came in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.25 A group of
motion picture studios had employed an encryption program called CSS
to protect movies distributed on DVDs. The system was intended to allow viewing only on DVD players and computers equipped with
technology that prevented copying. A Norwegian teenager reversedcautious in formulating exemptions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 27, 2000) (exempting from
the circumvention prohibition literary works and databases protected by access controls that
fail because of malfunction, damage, or obsolescence and works consisting of compilations of
websites blocked by filtering software); 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003) (exempting access controls on e-books that prevent use of read-aloud functions).
22.
Additionally, the prohibition on the distribution of devices capable of circumventing protective measures used on copyrighted works means that those devices will not be
readily available to circumvent protective measures used on public domain works.
23.
17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000). The anti-circumvention provisions are also backed by

their own criminal penalties in § 1204, including fines of up to $ 1 million and 10 years in
prison for repeat offenders. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000).
24.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001). See also
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("In short, the statute bans trafficking in any device that bypasses or circumvents a restriction on copying or
performing a work. Nothing within the express language would permit trafficking in devices
designed to bypass use restrictions in order to enable a fair use, as opposed to an infringing
use.").
25.
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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engineered a protected DVD and developed a decryption program he
called DeCSS.26 The decrypted movies could be played on noncompliant equipment; they could also be copied onto DVDs or transmitted over the Internet. The defendant Corley ran a web site that offered
DeCSS for downloading and also contained links to other sites where the
DeCSS program was available. The Second Circuit upheld an injunction
under the DMCA barring the defendant from posting DeCSS on his web
site or knowingly linking to other sites where it appeared. Although the
court said that the DeCSS program was protected speech, it held that the
anti-circumvention provisions targeted only the functional, non-speech
component of the program and thus were content-neutral restrictions. It
found the government's interest in preventing unauthorized access to
encrypted copyrighted works sufficiently substantial to defeat the defendant's First Amendment challenge. The court also rejected an argument
that the anti-circumvention rules had the unconstitutional effect of eliminating fair use. Deciding whether fair use is actually entitled to
constitutional status under either the First Amendment or the Copyright
Clause was unnecessary according to the court, since the defendant web
site owner was not seeking to make fair use of any copyrighted work. As
to third parties wishing to make fair use of the plaintiffs' encrypted movies, the court said that the statutory right of fair use under the Copyright
Act did not guarantee the right to copy a work in its original format; users could still quote from the movies, or even copy portions necessary
for fair use with a camcorder during playback of the encrypted DVDs.
There was also the obligatory deferral to Congress on the public policy
implications of the DMCA.27
Similar conclusions were reached in United States v. Elcom Ltd.
when constitutional challenges to the anti-circumvention rules were
raised in the context of a criminal prosecution. 28 The defendant sold a
Windows-based program that could remove the technological restrictions
26.
Jon Johansen (a/k/a "DVD Jon"), the 15-year old who developed DeCSS in order to
watch protected DVDs on his Linux-based computer, was acquitted on criminal charges
brought under Norway's data security laws. The Oslo City Court apparently believed that he
could not be convicted of breaking into his own DVDs. Timothy L. O'Brien, Norwegian
Hacker, 19, is Acquitted in DVD Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at C4. The acquittal
was ultimately upheld on appeal. Verdict Upheld in DVD Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23,
2003, at C5.
27.
"In facing ['the fundamental choice between impairing some communication and
tolerating decryption'], we are mindful that it is not for us to resolve the issues of public policy implicated by the choice we have identified. Those issues are for Congress." 273 F.3d at
458.
28.
203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The defendant was eventually acquitted,
apparently because of doubts about whether the violation was willful, as required under
§ 1204. Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared of Illegal Software Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2002, at C4.
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from content files formatted for Adobe's eBook Reader. It was indicted
under § 1204 for willfully violating the anti-trafficking provisions in
§ 1201(b)(1). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising a
variety of constitutional objections. Following the analysis in Corley,
Judge Whyte held that the DMCA did not violate the defendant's First
Amendment rights since the restrictions were content-neutral and furthered the government's substantial interests in preventing unauthorized
copying and promoting electronic commerce. The defendant's assertion
that the restrictions infringed on the First Amendment rights of third parties by compromising access to public domain works and undermining
fair use was also rejected. Even if those rights were protected by the
First Amendment, they had not been substantially impaired. Protecting
technological restrictions on the use of particular copies of public domain works did not amount to an impermissible grant of rights in the
public domain work itself. As for fair use, although a user might find it
more difficult to engage in some fair uses of electronic texts, the DMCA
neither eliminated nor substantially impaired fair use rights. The court
also rejected an argument that Congress had exceeded its power under
the Copyright Clause in enacting the anti-circumvention provisions.
Judge Whyte held that the restrictions on trafficking in circumvention
devices were a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and were not fundamentally inconsistent with any aspect
of the Copyright Clause. 9 Although legal challenges to the anticircumvention rules will doubtless continue, the early results are not encouraging to those counting on the courts to redress any perceived
imbalance between owners and users.
Congress is an even less likely source of aid for users. The privilege
to use self-help in the protection of tangible property, both real and personal, has a long history in American law. Reasonable force can be used
to protect one's land and chattels;3 ° even use of mechanical devices reasonable under the circumstances-a barbed wire fence, for example-is
permissible." Reasonable force can be employed to recover property
tortiously taken.3" Injunctive relief against tortious conduct may be de-

29.
The court relied on the analogous result reached by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Moghadam, 175 E3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). That
case upheld a federal criminal statute imposing substantial penalties for making unauthorized
recordings of live musical performances. According to the court, the fact that congressional
power to protect "Writings" under the Copyright Clause might not extend to unfixed works
like live performances did not preclude Congress from extending copyright-like protection to
those works under the Commerce Clause.
30.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (1965).

31.
32.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

of TORTS § 84 (1965).
of TORTS § 100 (1965).
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nied if self-help seems an adequate alternative.33 Self-help protection of
intellectual property is also well-known. The owner of a trade secret, for
example, has no claim against a competitor who uncovers the secret by
analyzing the owner's publicly available product,34 but no rule of law
prevents the owner from trying to make such reverse engineering hard or
impossible. In copyright, many of the statutory "rights" of users-fair
use,35 making back-up copies of software,36 home copying of musical
recordings 3 7 -are actually only limitations on liability for copyright infringement. Nothing in the Copyright Act expressly requires a copyright
owner to accommodate such uses or prohibits the use of technology in
an attempt to thwart them.38 Indeed, nothing in the Act requires a copyright owner to make the copyrighted work available in any form. 39 It
seems improbable that Congress will forbid the use of self-help protective measures by copyright owners. The anti-circumvention rules of
course go further, backing such self-help measures with the force of law.
However, given the congressional enthusiasm for the provisions, a serious legislative reassessment of even that step also appears unlikely.
Both the House and Senate seem convinced that legal prohibitions
against the circumvention of technological protection measures are a
necessary prerequisite to the development of a flourishing on-line marketplace for copyrighted works. They fear that without that protection,
many copyright owners will refuse to allow their works to be distributed

33.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS §§ 938, 950 (1965).
34.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 43 (1995).
35.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
36.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
37.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
38.
The first sale doctrine in § 109, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000), however, is phrased in
terms of an entitlement rather than as a limitation on liability. However, the entitlement is
merely to transfer possession of the particular physical copy owned by the user. Technological
protection that limits the use of that copy to certain geographic regions or to compliant devices
does not technically intrude on the entitlement to transfer possession. See U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 74 (2001) ("The first sale doctrine does not guarantee
the existence of a secondary market or a certain price for copies of copyrighted works."). The
Copyright Office Report does acknowledge that technological protection that "tethers" a copyrighted work to one particular device makes the ability to dispose of the copy a "useless
exercise," but concludes that it would be premature to consider a legislative response. Id. at
75-76. Another exception is § 1201(k)(2), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2000), which prohibits
television broadcasters from employing a particular anti-copying technology except on specified transmissions. The limitation was adopted as part of a compromise that requires
manufacturers of analog video cassette recorders to incorporate the designated copy control
technology into their machines. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (k)(1) (2000).
39.
Copyright protection subsists as soon as a work is created, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000),
defined in section 101 as when the work is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "created"). There is no requirement that the work be published or otherwise made available to the public.

10
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or performed over the Internet.40 According to Congress, circumventing
measures used to safeguard copyrighted works basically amounts to burglary.4 Strong anti-circumvention rules also set the standard for similar
protection abroad, safeguarding global markets for American works. Indeed, repeal of the anti-circumvention provisions in their entirety would
probably leave the United States in violation of its obligations under the
World Intellectual Property Organization's Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty to provide protection against the
circumvention of technological measures used by authors and performers to protect their rights under international law.42
The merits of the DMCA aside, users almost certainly lack the political clout to force a dramatic rollback of the anti-circumvention rules.
The rules are backed by powerful interests, notably Hollywood and the
music industry, while opponents (mainly file-swappers and downloaders,
supported by handfuls of academics), although numerous, are unorganized and less single-minded. 3 In fashioning the DMCA, Congress took
particular note of the economic importance of the copyright industries. 44
40.
"Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide
virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available
on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy. Legislation implementing the [World Intellectual Property Organization's Copyright
Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty] provides this protection and creates the
legal platform for launching the global digital on-line marketplace for copyrighted works." S.
REP. 105-190, at 8 (1998). "When copyrighted material is adequately protected in the digital
environment, a plethora of works will be distributed and performed over the Internet." H.R.
REP. 105-551, pt. 1 at 10 (1998).
41.
"The act of circumventing a technological protection measure put in place by a
copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work is the electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.' H.R. REP. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17.
42.
See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, art. 11, S. TREAT. Doc. 105-17 (1997),
36 I.L.M. 65, 71; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 18, S. TREAT. Doc. 10517 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65, 74.
43.
Copyright laws are written largely through negotiations between the major players
in the copyright industries. See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661,
1684-86 (1999). There have been some attempts to organize popular opposition to the anticircumvention rules, notably by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See Jefferson Graham,
Little Guy Battles the RIAA Giant, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2003, at 3D. The magnitude of the
political task facing opponents of the anti-circumvention rules is evident in a suggestion by
Senator Orrin Hatch, former Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee (with jurisdiction over
copyright bills) and composer of inspirational songs such as The Answer's Not in Washington.
At a hearing on peer-to-peer transfers of musical works, he endorsed technology that would,
after two warnings, fry the file-sharer's computer. See Jon Healey, Deep-Six Computers to
Sink Net Pirates?,L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at Cl.
44.
"[The copyright industries contribute more to the U.S. economy and employ more
workers than any single manufacturing sector, including chemicals, industrial equipment,
electronics, food processing, textiles and apparel, and aircraft. More significantly for the
WIPO treaties, in 1996 U.S. copyright industries achieved foreign sales and exports of $60.18
billion, for the first time leading all major industry sectors, including agriculture, automobiles
and auto parts, and the aircraft industry." S. REP. 105-190, at 10 (1998).
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Philosophy too may be running against the users' case. The Republican
ascendancy in Congress has brought increased prominence to the role of
private property. For copyright, the result has been less concern with the
balance between protection and access and greater emphasis on private
property rights in works of authorship. The current thinking is succinctly
captured by Senator Orrin Hatch: "The first principle of a contemporary
copyright philosophy should be that copyright is a property right that
ought to be respected as any other property right."4'5
Even if Congress could be persuaded that some moderation of the
anti-circumvention rules was appropriate in order to recalibrate the balance between owners and users, practical difficulties may make
meaningful adjustment impossible. The prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A)
against the act of circumventing access controls could of course be softened by precluding liability when the circumvention doesn't result in an
infringement of the copyright in the protected work--circumvention to
make a fair use, for example. 6 However, for most users circumvention is
possible only when the technological means are supplied by someone else,
which is precisely what the anti-trafficking provisions in §§ 1201(a)(2)
and 1201(b) are designed to prevent. Adjusting those provisions is no easy
matter. Rules on circumvention devices seem to require something close to
an "all" or "nothing" choice, and "nothing" is an unrealistic option for
Congress. Circumvention devices cannot divine the motives of the users
who employ them. Devices capable of overcoming access and copy controls in order to permit non-infringing use also leave the work vulnerable
to the kinds of reproduction and distribution that prompted the DMCA.
Two bills introduced to temper the anti-trafficking rules illustrate the
difficulty. One would have exempted the manufacture or distribution of
devices "capable of enabling significant noninfringing use of a copyrighted work"47; the other would exempt devices "necessary to make a
noninfringing use" as long as the device was "designed, produced, and
marketed" for that purpose.48 For better or worse, both proposals would
largely nullify the ban on circumvention devices. Neither bill made any
progress. There have also been more heroic efforts to find a compromise
on circumvention devices. Professor Alfred Yen, rejecting the inevitability
of an all or nothing approach, has proposed a regulatory scheme for circumvention devices modeled on federal gun control. Sellers would be
45.
Orrin Hatch, Toward a PrincipledApproach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of
the Millennium, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 721 (1998). See Denicola, supra note 13, at 205-06.
46.
Two bills introduced in the 108th Congress would have added a defense to circumvention along these lines. See H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003), introduced by Representative
Boucher, and H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003), introduced by Representative Lofgren.
47.
H.R. 107, supra note 46, § 5(b)(2).
48.
H.R. 1066, supra note 46, § 5(2).
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licensed and sales recorded. The devices would be available only in hardware form to reduce further distribution, and sales to minors (perhaps
more prone to infringing uses) would be banned. 9 Professors Dan Burk
and Julie Cohen have suggested that the law require owners to incorporate
"fair use defaults" into their protective measures that would accommodate
the customary norms of permissible use. This is coupled with a proposal
that owners be required to deposit "keys" to their protective technology
with an organization such as the Library of Congress that could evaluate
and respond to user requests for broader access on a case by case basis. °
The administrative burdens alone seem sufficient to preclude serious congressional consideration of these or similar ideas.
Meanwhile, technological protection measures continue to proliferate.
After experimenting with copy-protected CDs in Europe (where fewer
consumers use computers to play or manage their music), the record companies appear poised to try out similar protection in the United States.5'
Licensed on-line music distribution systems employ a variety of technological restrictions aimed at controlling the use of purchased music files.52
DVDs have included copy protection since their inception 3 ; they also contain embedded regional codes designed to limit play to DVD players
coded for a particular geographic region.54 Some video games include
similar regional restrictions.55 Electronic books have measures designed to
control both printing and electronic distribution.56 Computer programs
sometimes require "activation" that effectively tethers the program to a
particular computer." A "broadcast flag" may soon
protect digital televi58
sion broadcasts from distribution over the Internet.
49.
Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's AntiTrafficking Provisions,2003 Wis. L. REv. 649 (2003).
50.
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).
51.
Ben Fritz, Inside Moves: Revolver Fires Blanks With iPod Users, Daily Variety,
June 23, 2004, at 5.
52.
See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
53.
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
54.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 74 (2001).
55.
See Sony Computer Entm't. Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (granting a preliminary injunction under the DMCA against the sale of a device
that allowed users to bypass the plaintiff's geographic restrictions).
56.
See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
57.
Microsoft's Windows XP program, for example, includes such a restriction. Russell
Kay, Microsoft Explains XP Software Activation, COHPUTERWORLD, Aug. 6, 2001, at 40. Intuit was forced to remove a similar restriction from its popular TurboTax program after users
complained about being unable to run the program on multiple computers. Intuit Apologizes
For Restricting Use of Tax Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at C4. Even the Copyright
Office has expressed concern about the implications of "tethering" for the first sale doctrine.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT

58.

75-76 (2001).

FCC Adopts 'Broadcast Flag' Rules to Curb Digital Broadcast Piracy; July 2005

Deadline, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1645, at 7 (Nov. 7, 2003).
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One restraint on the deployment of technological protection measures
still remains. Copyright owners need a market for their works. A reduction
in consumer demand for works that are wrapped too tightly in protective
technologies would force owners to reassess the costs and benefits of the
protection. However, the market can effectively restrain the use of protective technologies only if consumers know about them in advance. The law
should insure that they do by implementing a system that will prompt
copyright owners to disclose the presence and effect of technological protection measures to prospective purchasers.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF DISCLOSURE

Orthodox economic analysis is skeptical of mandatory disclosure
rules. The market itself provides sufficient incentive for sellers to disclose information about their products according to the traditional view.
A rational consumer will presume that the quality of a product is the
lowest that is consistent with the information that the seller supplies,
since if the quality was higher, the seller could increase the product's
value in the eyes of consumers simply by providing more information.
Buyers, in other words, will presume that any undisclosed information
must be unfavorable to the seller. Even a monopolist thus has an incentive to provide information about the quality of its product. Consumers
will (and should) assume the worst, so if the product is better than the
worst, the seller will be better off disclosing more information. For example, if a seller of aluminum foil does not disclose how many feet are
in the roll, consumers will assume that it probably contains less than the
amount in products that do disclose their quantity; if the seller's product
actually contains the same amount or more, the seller has an incentive to
disclose the quantity to consumers. Mandatory disclosure rules and their
associated costs are thus unnecessary. 60 Under this analysis, copyright
owners already have an incentive to tell prospective buyers about technological protection measures that limit the use and enjoyment of a work in
order to keep those buyers from assuming that the work is even more
tightly controlled than it actually is. There is thus no need for a mandatory disclosure requirement.
This analysis of course fails to account for the existence of mandatory disclosure laws in numerous markets ranging from securities and
credit to food. There are many possible explanations. In some cases,
59.
See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
DisclosureAbout Product Quality, 24 J.L. & EcON. 461 (1981).
60.
"If information transmittal or warranties are costless, then there is no role for government intervention to encourage disclosure." Id. at 479.
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sellers with lower quality goods may feel that the benefit of a disclosure
that would distinguish their product from the very worst is outweighed
by the detriment of reminding consumers how far their product is from
the very best.6' Additionally, since the incentive for voluntary disclosure
comes from the threat of adverse inferences that consumers may draw in
the absence of the disclosure, the incentive to disclose weakens if some
consumers are not conscious of the issue at the time of purchase. Also, if
the percentage of consumers who would understand a disclosure is low,
sellers may choose not to disclose since any attempt to capture the increased value of the product to knowledgeable consumers through a
higher price could reduce sales to consumers who do not understand the
significance of the information.6 ' This may be a significant issue with
respect to technical information about access and copy controls used on
copyrighted works.63
The proof is in the pudding, and many copyrighted works in fact
make little or no reference to their accompanying protective measures.
The packaging for most DVDs, for example, contains no statement that
reveals their ubiquitous 64 anti-copying protection. Additionally, the only
reference to the regional coding that limits play to DVD players marketed in a specific area of the world is usually a cryptic statement that
the DVD is licensed for distribution only in the United States. (The
movie studios do, however, find enough space on the packaging to point
out that copyright infringement can be a criminal offense.) Software
packaging also typically includes little useful information about technological protection measures.65 The record companies' initial experiments
with copy-protected CDs in 2001 led to at least two lawsuits alleging
that sales of the products without adequate warning labels amounted to

61.
See, e.g., Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product
Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000) (finding that
prior to a mandatory disclosure law, some salad dressings in the middle range of the fat distribution chose not to distinguish themselves from products with higher fat content through
voluntary disclosure).
62.
See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 45

(2003).
63.
A survey in 2003 conducted by chip maker Advanced Micro Devices found that
about half of PC users didn't understand the term "megahertz", which has long been used in
computer advertisements. Sam Diaz, Tech Jargon Confuses Consumers, San Jose Mercury
News, July 17, 2003, at 2E.
64.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 E3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
65.
The packaging for Microsoft's Windows XP software does include a marginally
informative reference to its protective measures: "This product uses technological measures
for copy protection-you will not be able to use this product if you do not fully comply with
the product activation procedures." It also states, "For installation and use on one computer"although it does not make clear that the admonition is technologically enforced.
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false advertising because consumers would assume that the CDs could
be used in all the usual manners. 66
What would happen if copyright owners were required to disclose
the existence and effect of their technological protection measures? Consumers would presumably take that information into account in
determining how much they are willing to pay for the product. Those
who otherwise would have been unaware of the presence or consequences of a protective measure might now conclude that the product is
worth less to them than they originally thought. At any given price the
seller will thus sell less, and this decrease in consumer demand translates
directly into decreased revenue. Even a monopolist will experience a
decrease in revenue when demand is reduced. 67 A loss of revenue resulting from the disclosure of technological protection measures will force
copyright owners to confront a basic question: Are their protective
measures worth that cost? When protective measures are largely unknown to consumers and hence have little impact on sales, technological
protection is basically costless for owners, and they have little disincentive to tightly control their works. However, when the protection affects
the bottom line, owners must think more carefully about how much protection they need and are willing to pay for through reduced revenue. All
of this depends on the assumption that consumers actually care about
technological protection measures and will place a higher value on less
protected works than on more protected ones. There is evidence that they
do. A 2003 survey found that while forty-one per cent of Internet customers would pay $17.99 for a CD with no copy protection, only ten per
cent would pay that amount for a CD that could not be copied, and more
customers would pay $19.99 for a DVD that could be copied than $9.99
681
for one that could not. Intuit, the largest seller of tax preparation software, was forced to drop a protective measure introduced in 2002 that
limited use of its TurboTax program to a single computer. In response to a
flood of customer complaints, the 2003 version could again be installed on
See Parties Settle Claim Over Crippled Music CDs; Discs' Shortcomings Will Be
66.
Stated on Label, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), Feb. 26, 2002 (commenting on the settlement in DeLise v. Fahrenheit Entm't. Inc., Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County, No.
CV 01-4297); Suit Alleges New Copy-Protected CDs Are Defective and Infringe on Fair Use
Rights, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. Daily (BNA), June 19, 2002 (describing Dickey v.
Universal Music Group, Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, No. 02-0264, a class action against five
record companies). Later releases of copy-protected CDs in the U.S. have included labels
warning of "copy management" software. See Fritz, supra note 51.
In the case of a monopolist, its profit-maximizing price might not change, but it will
67.
sell less than it did before at that price, and hence its total revenue and profits will be reduced.
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS of LAW § 9.2 (3d ed. 1986).
Chris Marlow, Study: Burnable Discs Worth More: Online Consumers Willing to
68.
Payfor Unrestricted Copying, HOLLYWOOD REP. March 31, 2003, at 8 (reporting on a survey
conducted by Jupiter Research).
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multiple computers.69 A vice-president of Tivo Inc., the digital video recorder company, predicts that overly restrictive video systems will
simply be rejected by consumers.70
The on-line music business offers a glimpse into the dynamics of a
market for copy-protected works. In an attempt to divert users from "pirate" music sharing networks like the original Napster 7 , the record
companies began experimenting with licensed online services in 2001.
Since the services were trying to sell a new kind of product, they could
not avoid describing the details of the product to potential customers,
including the technological restrictions demanded by the record companies. The early versions of music services like Rhapsody and Pressplay
limited users to online streaming of songs and attempted to prevent the
copying of music files onto CDs. By 2002, market forces had compelled
the services to permit some CD burning, although often with technological restrictions such as limits on the number of tracks from a single
artist.7 2 The next breakthrough came in 2003 with the launch of Apple's
iTunes online service, which eliminated most of the restrictions on CD
burning, allowed music files to be copied onto multiple computers, and
made it easy to transfer files to portable music players.73 By 2004, most
online services had at least matched iTunes' relatively limited protection.74 Step by step, the record companies had surrendered technological
protection to increase their online customer base and revenues. One story
on the industry summed up the trend: "Prodded by flagging sales and a
surge in illegal downloading, the music industry has become much less
restrictive in licensing its tunes to legal download services. ' 7

69.

Intuit Apologizes for Restricting Use of Tax Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at

C4.
70.
Mark Cutler, Markeplace Will Dictate to Content Owners What Content, Rights to
Provide Consmuers, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), March 11, 2003,

(statement of Tivo Inc. Vice President Matthew Zinn).
71.
Napster was eventually liquidated in the aftermath of litigation with the record
companies. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Saul
Hansell, AOL Reaches to Create Its Own Big Music Scene on the Internet, N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 2002, at Cl. It has since been reborn as a licensed online service. David Pogue, Paying the
Piper Round 2: The Repertory Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at GI.
72.
See, e.g., Tom Di Nome, You Listen, You Pay: Post-Napster Music Services, N.Y.
TIMES, March 7, 2002, at G9; Jon Healey, Online Music Catalogs Lacking, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
1,2002, at C3.
73.
See, e.g., David Pogue, Online Piper Payable by the Tune, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2003, at GI ("[I]t's the first music service that doesn't view every customer as a criminal-inwaiting.").
74.
See J. D. Biersdorfer, A Crowded Bandwagon Yields Music Without Worries, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at G6.
75.
Clint Swett, Legal Online Music Sales on the Upswing, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Feb. 17, 2004, at D2.
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In the record industry, and probably in other industries as well, different copyright owners may place different values on technological
protection. Small record labels, for example, may value the publicity that
comes with broader distribution more highly than a major label with
well-known performers, and hence feel less threatened by file-sharing.
The increased exposure generated through looser control is seen by some
small record labels as a way to compete with the advertising and radio
access available to the major companies.76 Some small labels even give
away some songs to promote an artist;77 others have sold CDs that contain unprotected MP3 music files along with the conventional audio
tracks in a gesture of good will toward their customers. 7 Lower overhead
may also give the smaller companies a different perspective. Records
from small labels often earn a profit after sales of ten to twenty-five
thousand copies; releases from major labels can require sales of half a
million records to break even. 79 All this could mean that in many markets
consumers might see a variety of different levels of technological protection-at least if they have sufficient information about the protective
measures to use their purchasing power to force the owners to bear the
cost of protection. This diversity in protection levels would be useful in
itself to remind consumers that highly restrictive protection measures are
not inevitable.
IV. A PROPOSAL
A bill to amend the CopyrightAct to provide that the failure to disclose the presence and principal effects of technological measures used
to control access to a copyrighted work or to protect a right of the copyright owner bars the owner from any relief against the circumvention of
such technological measures or the manufacture or distribution of devices producedfor the purpose of circumventing such measures.

"'Our music, by and large, when kids listen to it, they share it with their friends.
76.
Then they go buy the record; they take ownership of it.'" Chris Nelson, Upstart Labels See
File Sharing as Ally, Not Foe, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C1 (quoting Rich Egan, president of Vagrant Records).
One small record company gave away four million mini CDs by a new pop singer
77.
embedded in the lids of soft drinks sold at movie theaters and theme parks. The straw fit
through the hole in the center of the CD. Brian Garrity, FarrisPops Up On Soda Lids: Music
Sampler Distributedat Theaters, Parks,Billboard, June 28, 2003, at 56.
Bill Werde, Two Labels Warm Up to MP3's, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at G7. The
78.

move is merely symbolic since it takes users only a few moments to convert a conventional
CD track into the MP3 format.
79.

Nelson, supra note 76.
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SEC. 1. Section 1201 of title 17 of the United States Code is
amended(a) by redesignating sections 1201(c) through 1201(k) as 1201(d)
through 1201 (1);
(b) by adding a new section 1201(c) as follows:
"(c)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it
is not a violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent
a technological measure applied to a copy or phonorecord of
a published United States work (as defined in section 101)
that has been lawfully obtained by that person if the copy or
phonorecord is not accompanied by a disclosure of the presence and principal effects of the technological measure that
was reasonably available to the person prior to the sale or
other distribution of the work to that person.
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b),
a person who manufactures, imports, offers to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in a circumvention technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, shall not
be liable in an action under section 1203 that is brought by a
person who has distributed to the public in the United States
more than a relatively small number of copies or phonorecords of works protected under this title that incorporate a
technological measure that can be circumvented by that technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
and that are not accompanied by the disclosure described in
subsection (c)(1)."
SEC. 2. Section 506(d) of title 17 of the United States Code is
amended to read as follows:
"Any person who, with fraudulent intent, removes or alters any
notice of copyright appearing on a copy of a copyrighted
work, or a disclosure relating to a technological measure as
described in section 1201(c)(1), shall be fined not more than
$2,500."
SEC. 3. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to copies or
phonorecords first distributed to the public prior to the effective date of the Act.
The proposed amendments to § 1201 would condition protection
against both circumvention and the distribution of circumvention devices
on adequate disclosure by the copyright owner. Under section (c)(1), an
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owner who fails to provide information about its technological
protection measures to a buyer prior to sale would have no legal recourse
against the circumvention of those measures by the buyer." The
restriction would apply whether the transaction involves a distribution in
the form of hard copies such as DVDs, CDs, or other media, or is instead
accomplished by means of a digital transmission." Under section (c)(2),
an owner who fails to provide the required disclosure in connection with
the distribution of "more than a relatively small number 8 2 of copies or
phonorecords containing technological protection measures would also
lose the ability to maintain an action against a person who manufactures or
distributes a device capable of circumventing those measures.83 Owners
will undoubtedly object that an obligation to disclose "the presence and
principal effects" of their protective technologies is unfairly vague. The
uncertainty, however, at least pushes in the right direction, encouraging
owners to disclosure more rather than less.
The exclusion from liability for circumventing protective measures
proposed under (c)(1) is limited to measures applied to a "United States
work (as defined in section 101)." The limitation is intended to insure
compliance with our treaty obligations. The United States is a party to
If the buyer's use of the copyrighted work violates an exclusive right of the copy80.
right owner under § 106, the owner could of course maintain an action for copyright
infringement.
See, e.g., § 115(c)(3), 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3) (2000) (applying the compulsory li81.
cense to make and distribute phonorecords of nondramatic musical works to both physical and
digital distributions).
The quoted standard is taken from § 405(a)(1), 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) (2000), where
82.
it is used to determine whether an omission of copyright notice on copies distributed prior to
the 1988 elimination of the notice requirement caused the work to enter the public domain. In
that context, the standard has generally been interpreted to mean more than a small number
relative to the total number distributed. See 2 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 7.13[A](2004).
There is at least tangential evidence that some owners think the ability to maintain
83.
protection against circumvention devices is worth the cost of disclosing potentially unfavorable information to prospective consumers. In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 292 F.Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff'd, 381 F3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), a seller of
garage door openers argued that sales of a replacement remote control device by a competitor
violated § 1201 because the remote control circumvented protection technology that the plaintiff had included in the garage door opener's computer system. The plaintiff lost on summary
judgment when the trial court held that the circumvention was authorized by the plaintiff since
consumers had a reasonable expectation that they could use replacement remote controllers
and plaintiff's packaging did not inform buyers of any restrictions on their ability to use replacement devices. By the time a related complaint involving the same two parties was
resolved by the U.S. International Trade Commission a few months later, the plaintiff had
rewritten its materials to warn consumers that use of replacement devices like the defendant's
was not authorized. See In re Certain Universal Transmitters for Garage Door Openers,
USITC Pub. 3670, Inv. No. 337-TA-497, 2004 WL 73233 (Jan. 14, 2004), aff'd, 69 Fed. Reg.
7980 (USITC, Feb. 20, 2004). (The plaintiff still lost before the Commission on grounds of res
judicata.)
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the World Intellectual Property Organization's Copyright Treaty, which
in article 11 obligates contracting countries to "provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures" used by authors to protect their rights
under the Copyright Treaty or the Berne Convention.4 Article 3 of the
Copyright Treaty also requires countries to "apply mutatis mutandis the
provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne Convention in respect of the
protection provided for in this Treaty."85 Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, in turn, insists that the rights granted to authors "shall not be
subject to any formality."8 6 The disclosure requirement proposed here as
a prerequisite to protection against circumvention might well constitute a
prohibited formality. However, the Berne Convention rule against formalities does not apply to protection in a work's country of origin. 7 The
definition of "United States work" in § 101 of the Copyright Act is specifically designed to cover only works whose country of origin for
purposes of the Berne Convention is the United States.88 Thus, although
we might violate our obligations under the Copyright Treaty if we conditioned circumvention protection for foreign works on disclosure, the
Treaty does not limit our ability to impose formalities on circumvention
protection for United States works. Similar reasoning justifies the current rule in § 411 of the Copyright Act that requires the formality of
copyright registration as a prerequisite to instituting an infringement action, but only when the work is a "United States work."'89
The proposal in (c)(2) that precludes owners who have distributed
too many protected copies of works without the required disclosure from
seeking relief against circumvention devices has not been similarly limited to "United States works." Article 11 of the Copyright Treaty literally
requires only protection and remedies against "the circumvention of effective technological measures"; it does not specifically demand that
84.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 42, art. 11. See also WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, supra note 42, art. 18.
85.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 42, art. 3.
86.
It is this requirement of the Berne Convention that prompted the United States in
1988 to abandon its 200-year old requirement of a notice of copyright as a prerequisite to
protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-569, 102 Stat. 2853.

87.

Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention provides that "[pirotection in the country of

origin is governed by domestic law." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art. 5(3) Hein's No. KAV 2245.
88.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "United States work); see also the definition of
"country of origin" in art. 5(4) of the Berne Convention. Beme Convention for the
Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 87, art. 5(4).
89.
17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2000). See also 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(3),(6) (2000) (restoring
copyright in works that had entered the public domain due to noncompliance with U.S. formalities, but only if the work was authored by a national or domiciliary of a Berne, WTO, or
WIPO treaty country other than the United States).

Fair'sFair

Fall 2004]

countries also extend protection against circumvention devices as the
United States has done in §§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b). Thus, it is at least
arguable that the prohibition on formalities is not applicable to device
protection.90
There have been previous proposals to compel the disclosure of
technological protection measures. A narrowly drawn bill introduced by
Representatives Boucher and Doolittle would have given the Federal
Trade Commission the authority to enforce disclosure requirements on
"digital music discs" by making it an unfair or deceptive practice under
§ 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to sell music discs that
failed to inform consumers about restrictions on their ability to play or
copy the discs. 92 A broader proposal by Senator Wyden similarly sought to
rely on the enforcement powers of the Federal Trade Commission through
a rulemaking proceeding aimed at requiring distributors of "copyrighted
digital content" to disclose limitations on a purchaser's ability "to play,
copy, transmit, or transfer such content." 93 The proposals made no headway, despite the support of a coalition of electronic equipment
manufacturers.94 Neither proposal would have placed a copyright owner's
protection against circumvention and circumvention devices at risk, and
only the Federal Trade Commission could have pursued violations under
the FTC Act.95 The proposal made here at least avoids the burdens of
administrative enforcement-indeed, it requires no independent enforcement from any quarter.
An attempt to tie circumvention protection to disclosure may have
some prospect of surmounting the practical and political obstacles that96
provisions.
confound more direct challenges to the anti-circumvention
Like the United States, however, the European Union's implementation of the
90.
WIPO Copyright Treaty includes protection against both circumvention and circumvention
devices. See Councile Directive 2001/29/EC , art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10. A more conservative approach to the formalities issue would limit the proposed restriction on device

protection in (c)(2) to persons who have distributed "more than a relatively small number of
copies or phonorecords of United States works (as defined in section 101)." Neither the circumvention nor the device proposal raises issues with respect to our obligations under the
World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs). That treaty, written prior to the WIPO Copyright Treaty, does not mention
circumvention and requires general adherence only to the Berne Convention, which also does
not cover circumvention. See also WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 42, art. 1(1) ("This
Treaty shall not have any connection with treaties other than the Berne Convention."); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 42, art 1(3).

91.

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).

H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
92.
S.692, 108th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2003).
93.
See Boucher Reintroduces Legislation To Allow Fairuse of DigitalMaterial, 65 Pat.
94.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1605, at 232 (Jan. 17, 2003).
1 STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 1:7 (2003).
95.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-50.
96.
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Most importantly, it does not seek to deprive copyright owners of the
protection that they-and Congress-believe is necessary to facilitate
the development of digital markets. It is one thing for owners to assert
with some sincerity that as a matter of economics and fairness they need
and deserve protection against circumvention and circumvention devices; it is quite another to make a credible assertion that their customers
have no right to know about the technological restrictions contained in
the products that they buy. Also, unlike proposals to scale back or eliminate circumvention protection, an approach based on disclosure can be
implemented in a manner consistent with our treaty obligations.9' It is
also consistent with, in fact supportive of, the market-oriented perspective that dominates the current Congress.
V. CONCLUSION

Copyright owners have used technology to maintain control over
their works since the beginnings of the digital age. In 1998, they succeeded in enlisting the law as an ally in their efforts. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act makes it illegal to circumvent their protective
technologies or to distribute devices designed for that purpose. Many
observers believe, however, that the anti-circumvention rules disrupt the
traditional balance that has secured the public interest in the face of
copyright's exclusive rights. Judicial challenges are unlikely to cure any
overbreadth. Poor policy is not beyond the constitutional authority of
Congress. The practical difficulties of fine-tuning the device restrictions
and the political power of copyright owners make significant legislative
adjustments unlikely. Besides, the owners may have a point. Perhaps in a
digital environment they do need and deserve the ability to protect their
works through technology. But owners should be forced to internalize
more of the costs associated with that protection. Making protection
against circumvention and circumvention devices contingent on disclosing the presence and effect of protective measures will produce more
informed choices by consumers. That in turn could force owners to be
more pragmatic in their approach to technological protection. A disclosure requirement is consistent with our treaty obligations and with the
prevailing politics of the times. It preserves the protection that copyright
owners may need, but it also creates practical constraints on their ability
to stray too far from the balance of protection and access that has traditionally defined the reach of copyright.
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